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No.20070117

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THOMAS PECK, aka Thomas Joseph Peck,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, and the UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL,
Defendants/Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Defendants-appellants State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol,
collectively, "Highway Patrol," submit this brief in sxipport of their interlocutory
appeal from an order denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code section
78-2-2(j), conferring jurisdiction on this Court over orders of any court of record
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2® (West 2004). On April 20, 2007, this Court entered an

order granting the Highway Patrol's petition for interlocutory appeal from the
denial of its motion for judgment on the pleadings.

ISSUES PRESENTED
Immunity from Suit
Governmental immunity is retained from claims for an injury that "arises
out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the incarceration of any person in
any . . . place of legal confinement." The injuries Plaintiff sustained happened
after troopers arrested him and restrained him in handcuffs, but before he was
transported to the jail. Is the Highway Patrol immune from liability for the
troopers' alleged negligence?

A. Standard of review
A trial court's decision whether to dismiss claims on grounds of
governmental immunity is a legal determination that this Court reviews for
correctness, without deference to the trial court's decision. Hall v. Utah State
Dep 't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34, H 11, 24 P.3d 958. Moreover, a trial court's
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court also reviews for
correctness. Blackner v. Dep 7 ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,1J8, 48 P.3d 949.
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B. Preservation of issue
The Highway Patrol raised this issue in its motion to dismiss and in its
subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 17-25; 76-86. The trial court
entered an order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings on January 19,
2007. R. 98-102. A copy of that order is attached as Addendum A.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutory provisions are attached in Addendum B to this
brief:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann.
Code Ann.
Code Ann.
Code Ann.

§ 63-30-2 (West 2004)
§ 63-30-3 (West 2004)
§ 63-30-4 (West 2004)
§ 63-30-10 (West 2004)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings based on governmental immunity. Plaintiff Thomas
Peck sued the Highway Patrol for injuries he sustained in a fall after two troopers
arrested and handcuffed him, but before he was transported to jail.

-3-

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Peck sued the Highway Patrol for injuries that he claimed were caused by
the negligence of two troopers. R. 1-13. The Highway Patrol filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that it was immune from liability because Peck's injuries arose
out of his incarceration in a place of legal confinement. R. 17-25. The trial court
denied the motion. R. 64-5. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an
opinion in Pace v. St. George City Police Dep % 2006 UT App. 494, U 4 , 153
P.3d 789, that supported the Highway Patrol's position on the applicability of
immunity. The Highway Patrol filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
reiterating its claim of immunity supported by Pace and the plain language of the
immunity act. R. 76-7. After the motion was fully briefed, R. 78-86; 87-91; 92-5,
the trial court issued a written decision denying the motion. R. 98-102 (Addendum
A). On February 21, 2007, the Highway Patrol timely filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal with this Court, R. 105-07, which was granted on April 20,
2007. R. 108.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are based solely on the material allegations of Peck's
Complaint, which should be assumed to be true at this stage of this case, that is, on
review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(6)and 12 (c) of

-4-

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hall, 2001 UT 34 at If 12; see also Wagner
v. State, 2005 UT 54, U 9, 122 P.3d 599, 602 (reviewing dismissal of negligence
claim based on statutory immunity).
On September 17, 2002, two Highway Patrol troopers arrested Peck for
driving under the influence of alcohol. R. 3, Complaint % 11. After the troopers
arrested Peck, they restrained him in handcuffs. R. 3, Complaint ^ 11. The
troopers then ordered Peck to stand in front of the patrol car while the rear seat of
the car was cleared so that he could be transported to the jail. R. 3, Complaint % 12.
Peck stood in front of the patrol car with his back turned to it and refused to face
the car. R. 3, Complaint ^ 17. When the troopers attempted to force Peck to face
the car, he fell and was injured. R. 3, Complaint ffl| 13, 14. Peck alleges that he
was injured because the troopers "negligently allowed [Peck] to fall on his face."
R. 3 & 6, Complaint^f

17, 31.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Peck's negligence claim against the Highway Patrol is barred by an
exception to the Highway Patrol's waiver of immunity for the negligence of its
employees.1 The governmental immunity act retains immunity for any injury that

'Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (West 2004). Effective July 1, 2004, the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act was replaced by the Governmental Immunity
Act of Utah. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 to -904 (West 2004). Because
the events here took place before the effective date of the new act, the provisions
-5-

"arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the incarceration of any
person in any . . . place of legal confinement." Peck was injured after Highway
Patrol troopers arrested and handcuffed him. Because he was in the control of the
Highway Patrol, was not able toieave without permission, and was in an area of
defined boundaries, he was incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. Thus, the
exception to the waiver of the Highway Patrol's immunity precludes Peck's
claims.

Argument
The Highway Patrol is statutorily immune from liability for Peck's
alleged injuries because those injuries arose out of, were in connection
with, or were a result of Peck's incarceration in a place of legal
confinement.
Utah courts make three inquiries to determine whether governmental
immunity precludes a suit against a governmental entity. Wagner, 2005 UT 54 at
Tf 12. First, the court determines whether the activity was a governmental function
and entitled to blanket immunity. Second, if the activity was a governmental
function, the court examines if another section of the act waives immunity. Third,
the court determines whether an exception to the immunity waiver applies and

of the old act are cited. The provision at issue in this case, however, is
substantially the same in both acts. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (j)
with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10).
-6-

retains immunity in the particular case. Id.
Here, the first two questions are not in dispute.2 It is the last question that is
at issue in this case - whether an exception to the waiver of immunicy applies aiid
retains the Highway Patrol's immunity from suit.
At the time of Peck's injuries in this case, the governmental immunity act
read as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of employment except if
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . ..
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or
city jail, or other place of legal confinement.. . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (West 2004). When this Court interprets any
statute, the rules of statutory construction require the Court to look first "to the
statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language, unless the language
is ambiguous." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at ^| 12. The legislature selected each term

2

A governmental function is "any act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity...." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). Law
enforcement activities are governmental functions. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp.,
775 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1989); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah App.
1989). In this case, the troopers were engaged in law enforcement activity at the
time of the subject incident. Accordingly, the conduct at issue is a governmental
function and the State is entitled to immunity. The act waives immunity if the
alleged injury arises out of a negligent act of an employee. In this case, Peck has
alleged that the troopers' negligence caused his injury. R. 3 & 6, Complaint Yh 17,
31. Accordingly, for purposes of the motion for judgment on the pleadings and
this appeal, the Highway Patrol's immunity for exercising a governmental function
has been waived.
-7-

advisedly, and the Court gives "effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning." Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 at ^ 6.
This case turns on the meaning of incarcerated in any place of legal
confinement. If Peck was incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, his suit
against the Highway Patrol is barred. Peck argued before the trial court that he
was not incarcerated because at no time was he either convicted or confined in a
physical building. But the meaning of incarceration in a place of legal
confinement is not so limited.
The governmental immunity act does not define incarcerated, place, or legal
confinement. But the ordinary meaning of incarcerate is "[t]o imprison" or "[t]o
confine." Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 at \ 6 (quoting The American Heritage
Dictionary 430 (4th ed. 2000). Confinement is understood to mean "[t]he act of
imprisoning or restraining someone." Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 127 (2d
pocket ed. 2001). Place is defined as "an area with definite or indefinite
boundaries, a portion of space; a room or space." The American Heritage
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) (online version http://www.bartleby.com).
Following the plain and ordinary meaning of incarceration and for over
twenty years, this Court has interpreted incarceration to mean more than
conviction. In Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971), this
Court interpreted incarceration broadly. In that case, the plaintiffs sued the state
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for the death of a voluntary patient at the state hospital. Id. at 1296. They argued
that the incarceration exception did not apply because the patient was not
incarcerated, having voluntarily gone to the mental facility, and was thus neither
convicted nor located in a jail or prison. In holding that the state was immune
from liability, the Emery court stated that "in reading the whole section," the
statute applied to a person who "cannot be released without some kind of
permission." Ttf. at 1297.
Five years later, in Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), the family of
a murder victim sued the state for negligently allowing a prisoner to escape. This
Court held that the state was immune from liability because the injury arose out of
the prisoner's incarceration or, in other words, being in the control of the state. Id.
at 244.
Following the reasoning of Epting, the Court examined the applicability of
the incarceration exception to the death of an inmate following surgery at the state
prison's hospital facilities. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). The
Madsen court held that the exception to the waiver of immunity applied to bar suit
because at the time of the inmate's death he was under the control of the prison
officials, even though the injuries were a result of the surgery. Id. at 93.
Based on this Court's prior precedents and the plain and ordinary meaning
of "incarceration" and "confinement," the Court of Appeals rejected the notion that
for the incarceration exception to apply, a person must be convicted or confined in
-9-

a jail, prison or mental hospital. Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 at f 7. In Pace, the wife
of an arrestee sued the St. George Police Department for wrongful death, claiming
that the police were negligent in failing to properly search and secure him. When
officers allowed the arrestee to use the restroom at the police department, he fatally
shot himself. Id. at U 2. Pace's wife sued, and the police department moved to
dismiss based on governmental immunity, claiming that the suicide arose out of,
was connected with, or was a result of Pace's incarceration. The trial court agreed
and dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at H 7.
The Pace court stated that because the suicide happened when Pace's
husband was under arrest and in police custody, he was therefore, "under police
control," and "could not be released without some kind of permission." Id. Thus,
the court concluded that the death "occurred 'in connection with' [Mr. Pace's]
incarceration in a 'place of legal confinement.'" Id. (quotations omitted). Pace's
physical location at the police department was not determinative of the application
the incarceration exception.
In this case, the trial court incorrectly determined that the Highway Patrol is
immune only when the incarcerated person is, at some time, confined or located in
a building. The trial court's construction of the statute - limiting "place of legal
confinement" to mean only a physical facility or building owned by the state - is
unfounded. There is no support for the trial court's conclusion that in order for the
incarceration exception to apply, a person must be confined in a physical facility or
-10-

building owned by the state. Nothing in the plain language of the immunity act or
case law supports such a limited view.
Like the arrestee in Pace, Peck was confined to a place of legal
incarceration but not in a building such as a jail, prison, or mental hospital. The
difference between Pace and this case is that Peck was not in a location with four
walls. But that is a distinction without a difference because Peck was in the
control of the state and could not leave without permission. He was confined to an
"area with definite boundaries." The incarceration exception applies to this case
and bars Peck's negligence claim against the Highway Patrol.3
Further, the purpose of the incarceration exception is frustrated under the
trial court's limited view of place of legal confinement. The purpose of the
exception is to protect the state's efforts to maintain control of those individuals in
state custody. That purpose cannot be achieved if immunity applies only when a
person in state custody was, at some time, confined or located within a building.
Moreover, this Court has consistently held that "c[t]he words "arising out
o f are very broad, general and comprehensive. They are commonly understood to
mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and require only that

3

Furthermore, it is well settled that the incarceration exception applies to
cases where the injuries that have occurred outside of a physical facility or
building owned by the state. See Epting, 546 P.2d at 244; Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d
1255, 1256-57 (Utah App. 1989).
-11-

there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk [provided for].'"
Taylor v. Ogden City Sck Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996) (alteration in
original, citations omitted). In other words, all that needs io be shown is a "but for"
link between the condition stated in Section 63-30-10(10), and the plaintiffs
claimed injuries. Id. See also Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at \ 15.
Here, Peck's injuries would not have happened "but for" his
arrest, his confinement in police custody, and his restraint in handcuffs. Peck was
undoubtedly in the control of the state; he could not leave without some kind of
permission, and he was confined in an area of defined boundaries. The fact that he
was not yet in a physical facility or building owned by the state makes no
difference. Peck was incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, and therefore
the Highway Patrol is statutorily immune from his negligence claims. The trial
court erred when it denied the Highway Patrol's motion to dismiss and motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

CONCLUSION
The Highway Patrol retains its immunity from suit for Peck's negligence
claims. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the
Highway Patrol's motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings and
dismiss Peck's suit with prejudice.
-12-

RESPECTFULLY submitted this ZCr

day of June 2007.

Peggy E. SktaJb l
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Appellants State of Utah
and Utah Highway Patrol
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing, BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS, was served by U.S. mail this

-^Xf) ~day of June, 2007, to the

following:
Bart J. Johnsen, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0340
Attorney for Thomas Peck
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ADDENDUM A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 1 9 2007
SALT LAKE COUKTY

MY)

IN Mil' I HUM1 M'IMl I \l M M Kit I 1'OM' I IN AMU H 'K

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS PECK, aka Thomas Joseph Peck,
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No -.h»iP6474

STATE OF UTAH, and THE UTAH
HIGHWAY PATROI ,,

1

Judge Stephen Henriod

Defendants.

This matter having come before the 1 \>ui i on ddendants State of Utah and the Utah
Highway Patrol's (collectively, the "State") Motion, foi Ji idgi i lei it • : n tl :i e PI sadii igs tl le C ;: \ 11 t
having reviewed the motion and memoranda, concludes as follows:
This ( isc iin'il'i » "

|

il i

"i H

'M'l'U'ml'i i "

MMti, when t<,\< i "jj,

Highway Patrol troopers placed plaintiff Thomas Peck ("Mr. Peck") under arrest for driving
K incgc^ mai j„iiug the anrest, the troopers negligently
caused him to fall to the ground resulting in injuries. The State has filed the current Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings alleging that the State is immune from suit under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

1

DISCUSSION
The State alleges that it is immune from Mr. Peck's lawsuit under Utah Code Annotated
§ 63-30-10, which states that "[ijmmunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:...
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement.. . ." The issue in this case is whether the State falls under this immunity waiver
exception for injuries arising out incarceration.
Mr. Peck and the State focus heavily on whether Mr. Peck was incarcerated, but the Court
believes the more important question is whether the injuries took place in a "state prison, county
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement." The State does not dispute that Mr. Peck was
not incarcerated in a state prison, county, or city jail, but instead contends that he was in a place
of legal confinement. In interpreting "oxner place of legal confinement," it is important to
remember the well known maxim of statutory construction that "when a statute contains a list of
specific words that relate to a certain type of item and those words are followed by a general
word, the general word should be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." State of Utah v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17 H 13,
133P.3d396.

2

Using that general principal, a state prison, county or city jail are all similar in that they
. :i

• vr

.. .-! . ... a, ; pal government. I Ins

c o m m o n sense interpretation also accords with the case law. See e.g. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d
92, 93 (Utah 1978) (incarcerated in state prison hospital); Emery v. State of Utah, 483 P.2d 1296,
1296 (Utah 1971) (incarcerated in a state 1 u >: I;J >iti tl); S'k ? ffieh 1v. 1 w I u ?/ 445 P 2< I 367, 3-68 ( I Jit J ,.
1968) (incarcerated in a state prison). This interpretation is not undermined by the State's

o \ IT Anp 4 l M « 2, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 9

was in police custody inside a police static

1 he State also cites Epting v. State oj h iah where the Utah Supreme Court held that the
actions of an individual who was in state prison, but escaped during a work release program, still
arose "out of the incarceration of any person in the state prison" because he was still under prison
• M >nti i )1 while doi

':

* ] )! 2\ 1 2 12: 2< i I (I Jt. ill 1

'

stands tor the proposition that once an individual has been incarcerated in a place of legal
c ;:» ifii len lent (iiit i tl iat case, tl le state pi isoi it), that ii idi i : li i la! ;::c i tii >" "»<' • +• "If >e incarcerated there for
purposes of the immunity statute as long as he is under the state's control, even though he m a y
1

\K phv.iuilly presnU \\\ IIK. iacihty when Ihc injury occurs

S ,KC

in Epting, Mr. I ^ c k w a s

never incarcerated in a physical facility owned by the State.

3

^\

Because Mr. Peck was never confined in a physical facility owned and controlled by the
State, he was never incarcerated in a "place of legal confinement" under the immunity statute and
therefore the incarceration exception does not apply. Therefore, the State has waived immunity
under § 63-30-10 and the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is accordingly DENIED.

DATED this

(f

day of January, 2007.

STEPH37HSMO57F
DISTRICpCpURf JX '
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I heieby certify \hrM 1 mailed a \Y\iC and correct copy of \he foiegoing OYV
Judgment on the Pleadings, to the following, this \6\ day of January, 2007:

Reed M. Stringham III
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O.Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856

Bart J. jonnsen
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340

Udi^SksujL

ADDENDUM B

F O R M E R GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

c ^3-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities
from suit
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility, and
from an approved medical, nursing, or other
professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique
or essential core governmental functions and,
notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63-30-10, governmental entities, political subdivisions, and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from the implementation of
or the failure to:
(a) implement measures to control the causes
of epidemic and communicable diseases and
other conditions significantly affecting the public health or necessary to protect the public
health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local
Health Departments;
(b) investigate and control -MLSJM , .<*'> : ><
rorism and disease as set out ii TitU
ter 23b, Detection of Public He.<u\• 1 •• * *
Act; and
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health emergency as defined in
Section 26-23b~102, or a declaration by the
President of the United States or other federal
official requesting public health-related activities.
(3)(a) For the purposes of this chapter only,
the following state medical programs and ser
vices performed at a state-owned university \vou
pital are unique or essential to the c o n «.;*
governmental activity in this state and are < .m
sidered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by anothei h<
tal or physician because of the high risk nature
of the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in
Utah only at a state-owned university hospital
or provided in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the
scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive ap
propriate medical care or treatment at *nnt**.-<
medical facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed
at a state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a
court finds is unique or essential to the core of
I^VefB^entaJ activity in this state.
fa) M afiy claim under this Subsection (3)
exceeds & e limits established in Section

63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess
claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legis1. : ,ti i e under Tide 63, Chapter 6.
(4) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the-construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems
by governmental entities are considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's
Justice Center are immune from suit for any
injury which results i r o m their joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title
62A. Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 3; Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 2; Laws 1981, c. 116, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 33,
§ 1; Laws 1985, c. 93, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 15.
§ 1; Laws 1991, c. 248, § 7; Laws 2003, c. 3 /
§ 5, eff. May 5, 2003.
See, now, § 63-30d-201.
§ 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial of liability—Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of
employee—Limitations on personal liability
( 0 ( a ) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as
an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental entities or their
employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this,
chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and
liability of the entity shall>be determined as if
the entity were a private person
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is
created by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be
construed as imposing strict liability o r absolute
liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed
as adversely affecting any immunity from suit
that a governmental entity or employee may
otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection
(3)(b), a n action under this chapter against a
governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs
during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive
remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any
other civil action or proceeding based upon the
same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through
fraud or malice;

STATE AFFAIRS

(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the
real or personal or for the possession thereof or
conditions
set
forth
in
Subsection
to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages
63-30-36(3)(c); or
or other liens thereon or to determine any ad(iii) in a judicial or administrative proceeding verse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, touching any mortgage or other lien said entity
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by may have or claim on the property involved.
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 6.
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under
See, now, § 63-30d-301.
this section.
§ 63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for negligent
(4) An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a representa- damage, destruction or loss of seized property
tive capacity if the act or omission complained
Immunity from suit of all governmental entiof is one for which the governmental entity may
ties is waived as to any claim based on the
be liable, but no employee may be held personnegligent destruction, damage or loss of goods,
ally liable for acts or omissions occurring durmerchandise or other property while in the posing the performance of the employee's duties, session of any officer or agency of state or local
within the scope of employment, or under color government, including law enforcement offiof authority, unless it is established that:
cers, if the property was seized for the purpose
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to of forfeiture under any provision of state law.
fraud or malice;
Initiative B, adopted Nov. 7, 2000, eff. March
(b) the injury or damage resulted from the 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 .
conditions
set
forth
in
Subsection
§ 6 3 - 3 0 - 8 . Waiver of immunity for injury
63-30-36(3)(c); or
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous con(c) in a judicial or administrative proceeding
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, dition of highways, bridges, or other structures
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmenmaterial to the issue or matter of inquiry under
tal entities is waived for any injury caused by a
this section.
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 4; Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 3; Laws 1983, c. 129, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 76, highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side§ 1; Laws 2002, c. 206, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002. walk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located on them.
See, now, § 63-30d-202.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 8. Laws 1991, c. 76,
§ 63-30-5, Waiver of immunity as to contrac- § 2 .
tual obligations
See, now, § 63-30d-301.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
§ 63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury
entitle? is waived as to any contractual obligation.' Actions arising out of contractual rights from dangerous or defective public building,
or obligations shall not be subject to the re- structure, or other public improvement—Exquirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, ception
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Divi- the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
sion of Water Resources is not liable for failure 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmento deliver water from a reservoir or associated tal entities is waived for any injury caused from
facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear a dangerous or defective condition of any public
River Development Act, if the failure to deliver building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
the contractual amount of water is due to public improvement,
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 9; Laws 1991, c. 76,
drought, other natural condition, or safety con§3.
dition that causes a deficiency in the amount of
available water.
See, now, § 63-30d-301.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 5; Laws 1975, c. 189,
§ 1; Laws 1978, c. 27, § 4; Laws 1983, c. 129, § 63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury
§ 4; Laws 1985, c. 82, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 2 5 1 , caused by negligent act or omission of employee—Exceptions
§-»Immunity from suit of all governmental entiSee now, § 63-30d-301.
ties is waived for injury proximately caused by a
§ 63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions negligent act or omission of a n employee cominvolving property
mitted within the scope of employment except if
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti- the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
ties is waived for the recovery of any property results from:

fOBME
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

a\ the exercise or performance or the failure
rcise or perform a discretionary function,
*£LT or not the discretion is abused;
*YtHss3ult, battery, false imprisonment, false
jfL
malicious prosecution, intentional tres,ffeS
abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit,
CSference with contract rights, infliction of
2 * ^ anguish, or violation of civil rights;
n> the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue,
S ^ T suspend' or revoke any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by
making an inadequate or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicfciis or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee
whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demon
Itrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any
Itite prison, county or city jail* or other place of
legal confinement;
:\t\) any natural condition on publicly owned
or controlled lands, any condition existing in
connection with an abandoned mine or mining
operation, or any activity authorized by the
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and
Sate Lands;
i (12) research or implementation of cloud
management or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earth(juakes, or natural disasters;
v (14) the construction, repair, or operation
Hood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle,
While being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective
condition of airy highway, road, street, alley,
j*$swalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, via**fy or other structure located on them;
I) a ' a t e n t dangerous or latent defective
? ™ u o n . of any public building, structure,
**», reservoir,, or other public improvement;
Wthe activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
&)fighting fire;
fc) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations;
W transporting or removing injured persons
* place where emergency medical assistance
^ ^ r e n ^ e r e d or where the person can be
^^sfx^ed by a licensed ambulance service; or

(0 intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a, Dam Safety, or Title
73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources—
Division of Water Resources, which immunity is
in addition to all other immunities granted by
law
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 10; Laws 1975, c. 194,
§ 11; Laws 1982, c. 10, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 169,
§ 1; Laws 1989, c. 185, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187,
§ 3; Laws 1989, c. 268, § 29; Laws 1990, c. 15,
§§ 1,2; Laws 1990, c. 319, §§ 1,2; Laws 1991,
c. 76, § 4; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 35, eff May 1,
1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 6, eff. July I, 1996;
Laws 1996, c. 264, § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws
2001, c. 185, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001.
See, now, § 63-30d-30J

22.

§ 63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking
pi ivate property without compensat ion
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for the recovery
of compensation from the governmental entity
when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property for public uses without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Title 78,
Chapter 34, Eminent Domain
Laws 1987, c. 75, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 76, § 5;
Laws 2004, c. 223, § 9, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws
2004, c 267, § 47, efif. July 1, 2004.
See, now, §§ 63^30d-301 and 63 ^
- v- Atiorneys' fees for records "re-'
quest.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for recovery of attorneys* fees
under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys* fees under
Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously
.with a petition for i ei iew i mder S^tinn
63-2-404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not
apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that; is
related to a claim for attorneys' fees under
Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a
subsequent action. Laws 1991, c. 259, § ^) Laws 1992, c. 280,
§ 56.

